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Monetary transmission in Poland: some evidence on interest rate and
credit channels
Ewa Wróbel*, Ma∏gorzata Paw∏owska**
Abstract
In the paper we show the macroeconomic effects of a monetary policy shock using both
recursive and non-recursive SVAR decomposition. We find that the responsiveness of the CPI index
and output in Poland is smaller and slower than in the euro zone. Using panel data we check how
bank-specific characteristics affect operation of the lending channel. In contrast to the results for
the euro area the degree of liquidity of an average bank seems not to work in a way predicted by
the literature. Credit channel seems to operate rather through the degree of capitalisation and
bank’s size. A plausible reason is the structural overliquidity of the banking sector. On the other
hand, the pass-through from the market interest rates to the loan and deposit rates is in general
not slower than in the euro zone. 
* National Bank of Poland (NBP), Bureau of Macroeconomic Research (Ewa.Wrobel@mail.nbp.pl). 
** National Bank of Poland (NBP), Financial System Department (Malgorzata.Pawlowska@mail.nbp.pl). The views
expressed in this paper are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Bank of Poland. The authors
wish to thank W. Charemza, D. Mayes and W. Or∏owski and colleagues from the NBP for helpful comments to the earlier
version of the text. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.  1
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1
Introduction
Monetary transmission in Poland tends to be slower and the response of output and inflation
to changes in central bank interest rates is smaller than in many developed economies (see ¸yziak,
2001, 2002; K∏os, Wróbel 2001). In this paper we show the reaction of main macroeconomic
variables on interest rate and exchange rate shock with a simple VAR using first Christiano,
Eichenbaum, Evans - CEE thereafter (1994) and then Kim and Roubini (1997) structural
decompositions. This is consistent with the approach adopted in the recent papers on monetary
transmission in the euro zone. Our aim is to: (i) compare the results with these recently obtained
for the euro countries, and (ii) check the stability of the monetary transmission mechanism in Poland.
Early results of the CEE structural decomposition for Poland on a sample of monthly data
1995.01-2000.12 provide (K∏os, Wróbel 2001). They show that the interest rate shocks affect
inflation and other selected nominal variables in a way similar to that in the developed market
economies. However, some real variables react in a counter-intuitive or even nonsensical way. A good
example is a phenomenon that we called “output puzzle”, i.e. an initial rise in output after monetary
policy tightening. Here we extend the sample and include the data covering the period 2001.01-
2002.03. Due to the evolution of the monetary policy we also change the assumptions about the set
of variables the central bank looks at when deciding about the level of the interest rate. 
Financial sector structure can exert a significant impact on the monetary transmission.
Therefore in the recent years analyses of the role of lending channel and interest rates pass-through
in the monetary transmission gained a particular attention resulting in papers by Cecchetti (1999),
De Bondt (2002), Sellon (2002), Weth (2002), Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000), Peek and
Rosengren (1995), Ehrmann et al. (2001) to name only a few. The lending channel literature points
that bank-specific characteristics can influence the cost of funding and induce either price-quantity
or pure quantity adjustment of bank behaviour. The European evidence shows indeed that the
degree of liquidity and capitalisation affect loan supply. Following this literature we show the
reaction of different categories of loans to the interest rate shocks and using panel data we
determine the bank-specific characteristics that affect the operation of lending channel. Our
conclusion is that in Poland lending channel operates, but in contrast to the Euro zone, size of a
bank is the second characteristic besides the degree of capitalisation, which matters. 
Empirical literature on the traditional interest rate channel provides a vast evidence showing
that in the U.S. and in the euro zone deposit and lending rates are sticky.  They do not react to
changes in money market rates immediately, but with lags amounting even to several months
slowing down the monetary transmission.  Nor do they adjust one for one. Also, there are
asymmetries in banks’ reactions: lending rates respond more to increases in money market rates
than to decreases, while the opposite is true for the deposit rates. This paper provides some
evidence on interest rate pass-through in Poland.
The paper is constructed in a following way: we start with discussing our methodological
framework: the specification of the VAR, methods of the structural decomposition, the approach to the
lending channel analysis and the method of estimation of the interest rate pass-through. Next, we present
the data and the results of our VAR estimates. In particular, we show the results of two recursive
decompositions, based on two sets of assumptions concerning monetary policy. We also use a non
recursive decomposition in the spirit of Kim and Roubini that imposes more structure on a VAR and is
potentially more suitable for a small open economy. Then, we briefly discuss the IRF of different categories
of credits to the non-financial sector to shed some light on how various types of expenditures respond to
the monetary policy shocks. Next we present the bank-specific characteristics affecting the lending channel
and finally the results of the estimation of the interest rate pass-through. The final part concludes. 8
2
Methodological framework
National Bank of Poland
2
Methodological framework
Vector Autoregression (VAR) approach provides evidence on stylized facts, which are then
used to discriminate between general equilibrium monetary models. If in the aftermath of the
contractionary monetary policy shock aggregate price level reacts very little, output falls temporarily
and interest rates rise, then the result is inconsistent with models assuming price flexibility (see for
example Favero, 2001). 
By using a VAR it is possible to determine a monetary policy shock and then to examine the
response of the endogenous variables to a monetary impulse. Analysis of the impact of the monetary
policy shocks (or unexpected changes) provides useful information on the transmission mechanism.
But a necessary condition for a VAR model to produce consistent monetary shocks is that the
monetary policy regime does not change within the period under consideration, the condition that
is difficult to fulfil by the economies in transition. In Poland changes in monetary policy regimes and
operating procedures were quite frequent. In particular, exchange rate regime evolved from a fixed
to a pure float. This makes VAR analyses difficult and leads us to shorten the sample, skipping the
period up to the end of 1994, to ensure a reasonable mix of sample homogeneity and length.  
First we follow CEE (1994, 1998) identification method. Monetary policy shock is then
identified with a disturbance term in a regression equation of the form:
(1)
where St is the monetary policy instrument, c is a linear function, Vt is the information set available
to the central bank when the monetary policy instrument is set, s is a positive number, and nst is a
serially uncorrelated shock that is orthogonal to the elements of Vt and has variance unity. The
assumption of orthogonality means that variables of the information set react to a monetary policy
shock only with a lag. This is a quite simple identification method, and therefore it is commonly
used to compare the responsiveness of the main macroeconomic variables to the monetary policy
shocks in different countries.  
If the true structure of the economy is in the VAR format:
(2)
where Yt matrix consists of three blocks: variables whose contemporaneous values appear in Vt,
monetary policy variable block and a block of variables which only appear with a lag in Vt. 
Thus, the CEE identification procedure requires assumptions about variables central bank
looks at when setting an operating instrument and supposition about the interaction of the policy
shock with the variables in the feedback rule. Variables that NBP used to consider changed
substantially over the period 1995-2002. Inflation rate (measured in terms of the CPI) was the only
stable item.  The other variables that the NBP looked at were following:
1) monetary aggregates, either broad money (m2) or credit to the non-financial sector or
deposits of private individuals;
2) exchange rate, measured as a deviation from the central parity;
3) current account deficit (with respect to the GDP);
4) output gap.2
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Up to 1997 monetary aggregate (m2) was used as an intermediate target of the monetary
policy. It was however gradually losing its role with inflation going down in spite of the fact that
monetary targets were systematically overshooted, reflecting instability of the demand for
money.  In 1998 Monetary Policy Council (MPC), a newly set up decision-making body, decided
to adopt inflation targeting. It has however carefully observed developments in the credit to the
non-financial sector as a variable reflecting inflationary pressures of the domestic demand.
Uncertainty of the output gap measures (a deviation of the current output from its long-term
equilibrium, the latter proxied with a trend), resulted from short time series not encompassing
even one business cycle and substantial structural and institutional changes of the economy.
Credit ceased to be a variable of a primary role in the interest rate setting process in 2000 and
was gradually replaced by the output gap. Another variable signalling demand pressure was
current account deficit. It started to play a significant role in the monetary policy setting in 1996,
when it began to grow noticeably. It was still considered as a crucial variable in the first years of
inflation targeting regime.   
Exchange rate as an implicit target was gradually losing its role with the exchange rate regime
getting more and more flexible. Up to 1997 exchange rate interventions were aimed at reducing the
scale of the z∏oty appreciation. Since the setting of MPC more stress was put on disinflation than on
output stimulation. Therefore, the z∏oty appreciation was considered rather as an advantage than a
drawback and the NBP resigned from interventions in the foreign exchange market.
In the previous work (see K∏os, Wróbel, 2001) we used real credit as a variable that central
bank looks at when setting the level of the instrumental variable. Thus, in our VAR estimate NBP
responds contemporaneously to inflation and has lagged credit in its policy rule. Bearing in mind
changes in monetary policy and to overcome the problem of limited information about the
variables in V, we do a second estimation using a different set of variables. We keep inflation rate
and add industrial output and the nominal effective exchange rate. In this specification, central
bank responds contemporaneously to inflation and output and to the lagged values of the
exchange rate; exchange rate is allowed to react contemporaneously to the interest rate shocks. The
same variable set for CEE decomposition for the euro zone was used by Peersman and Smets
(2001)
3 and for the U.K. by Bean, Larsen, Nikolov (2001). We shall discriminate between the two
specifications simply analysing the impulse response functions.
Then, in the case when we assume that the central bank considers contemporaneous
developments in prices and takes into account lagged information on credit, we have: 
(3)
Or alternatively, if it considers contemporaneous developments in output and prices and
lagged exchange rate we have:
(4)
where yt stands for the industrial output, pt represents price level (CPI index), it is the short-term
interest rate, lt stands for loans to the non-financial sector (private persons and the corporate
sector), et is the nominal effective exchange rate. Once the monetary policy shock is extracted, we
examine the response of some real and nominal variables. Real variables include retail sales and
unemployment rate, while nominal variables – money supply (m1) and 12-month Treasury Bill rate.
To do this, we added to the list of our variables the variable we were interested in, placing it last in
the ordering.  
3 Peersman and Smets use real effective rather than nominal effective exchange rate.   10
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Then, to check for the robustness of the results we use a structural decomposition  in the
spirit of Kim and Roubini that is more suitable for the open economies than CEE. This
decomposition imposes more structure on the VAR. The specification of the model is:
(5)
As before, both output and price level are restricted to respond to the monetary policy with
a lag. But now, the identification scheme makes it possible to introduce simultaneous feedbacks
between exchange rate and interest rate. In particular, we allow the interest rate to react to the
news in the exchange rate, (et), and the exchange rate to react contemporaneously to news in all
other variables. Peersman and Smets (2001) use Kim and Roubini decomposition for the euro area. 
While this approach provides some information on the stylised facts and monetary policy
propagation, it does not give enough information to discriminate between competing theories of
the monetary transmission. In particular, the results of these decompositions cannot distinguish the
lending channel and the interest rate channel or provide information on their relative importance.
Nor do they provide information whether the interest rate channel operates rather through
consumption or the investment expenditures. To shed some light into the latter question we show
the responsiveness of short, medium and long-term loans to the private individuals and to the
corporate sector to the interest rate shocks. This is done using a previously specified VAR and
applying CEE decomposition method. There is no data on consumption of durables, but assuming
that medium-term and, in part, short-term credits of households are used for durables’
consumption, while long-term credits are mostly used for financing housing, these results may
provide a good judgement about different types of expenditures. 
To  check what bank-specific characteristics affect the lending channel we estimate an
equation as in Ehrmann et al. (2001):
(6)
with i = 1,...,N and t = 1,...,ti and where N denotes the number of banks and l the number of lags;
Lit - the loans of bank in quarter t to private non-banks; 
D rt -represents the indicator of monetary policy – NBP reference rate, i.e. the yield on 28-
days NBP-bills
Dlog(GDPt) - growth rate of real GDP;
inft-j   - inflation rate;
xi - bank-specific characteristics.
The model allows for fixed effects across banks, as indicated by the bank-specific intercept ai.
A usual assumption in the credit channel literature is that bank responsiveness to the
monetary policy is explained by its size, the degree of liquidity and capitalisation. Namely, small, less
liquid and less capitalised banks are expected to cut lending more than their bigger, more liquid
and better-capitalised units.   
Finally, we assess the responsiveness of the banking sector to the money market rates. In this
aim we use an ECM approach. We estimate equation of a form:2
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(7)
where r stands for a respective retail rate, mr is money market rate, and D represents first difference
operator; and a1, b1, b2 > 0.
The coefficient a1 measures an instantaneous reaction of banks, i.e. the reaction that occurs
within a month. The ECM specification allows for a cointegration of banks’ retail rates and market
rates. For the interest rates to be cointegrated, the coefficient b1 should be significant. We do not
impose that coefficient b2 is equal to 1 (i.e. the homogeneity between banks’ rates and the money
market rates), but rather estimate it. Following de Bondt (2002) we calculate for Poland the mean
adjustment lag of the full pass through as (11a1)/b1, (see Hendry, 1995, p. 287). 12
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3
Data 
Most of our estimations cover the period 1995.01-2002.02. The most important exception
are panel data- these are quarterly and the sample covers period 1997.4-2001.4. All variables
except for interest rates and exchange rate are seasonally adjusted using the procedure X-12, and
all except interest rates are in log levels
4. To eliminate the remaining traces of seasonality in the VAR
models we used seasonal dummies.  Macroeconomic data come from the Central Statistical Office;
monetary data and retail interest rates are collected by the NBP. Money market rates come from
Reuters. Loan rates are prime rates as declared by banks. NBP does not posses information on the
relative share of fixed and variable rates. If a bank declares both fixed and variable interest rates on
a product, say 3-month deposit, NBP would take into account only the variable rate when
calculating a weighted average interest rate. This very fact probably leads to some overestimation
of the adjustment speed. With the mentioned above exception of the panel data, we use monthly
data in our estimates. To choose the lag length we used Akaike criterion, but in cases of a serial
correlation of a disturbance term in a VAR model we used more lags. 
4 We do not detrend the time series. 4
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4
Estimation results 
4.1. A broad overview of monetary transmission: SVAR estimates
The results of the CEE decomposition with credit and inflation in V for Poland are ambiguous
(Fig. 1). While some variables – retail sales, monetary aggregates and interest rates respond to the
monetary policy shock in the expected way, other react either partially, like industrial output and
CPI, or totally – like the unemployment rate – in a counter-intuitive way. Angeloni et al (2001) report
that a number of VAR estimates show similar properties – the examples include an increase in GDP
after monetary tightening in Ireland and the Netherlands, and a positive response of investment in
Austria, Greece, in the Netherlands and in the US. It should be stressed that after a nominal shock,
real variables fall – as expected – only temporarily. CPI reaction exhibits two features which are not
predicted by the theory. The first one is a common in the VAR literature “price puzzle”, the other is
a gradual return of the index to the baseline5. When we have extended the reaction period to 48
months (we do not show it in the paper) we got the picture of the reaction function that stabilises
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Fig. 1 
IRF from CEE decomposition (specification of the VAR as in K∏os, Wróbel, (2001), i.e. real
credit in  V)
5 Peersman and Smets (2001) show a similar result for one country of the euro zone.14
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The second specification of the VAR, i.e. the one with output, CPI, and exchange rate in V,
produces a much smaller “output puzzle”, but nonetheless it still exists. As Zi´ba (2002) shows
using Blanchard-Quah decomposition of a GDP-unemployment rate bivariate VAR, over the period
1992-2001 in Poland, GDP growth was dominated by supply shocks. Sterne and Bayoumi (1993)
obtained a similar result, i.e. a dominance of supply shocks over demand shocks in output growth
for economies changing structure away from agriculture (Ireland, Portugal, Greece and Spain over
the period 1960-1988). Dominance of supply shocks, resulting in permanent changes in output
may at least in part explain the “output puzzle” in Poland. As expected, the reaction of output and
retail sales to the monetary policy shock is only temporary. Narrow money and the yield on 12-
month T-Bills react in a way similar to the one obtained in the previous specification. As before,
unemployment rate responds to the contractionary monetary policy shock in a counter-intuitive way
(Fig. 2 and Fig. 3).  
The perverse reaction of the unemployment rate has at least a few reasons. As in the case of
the “output puzzle” it is probably due to the supply shocks and institutional shocks. These include
privatisation, as well as changes in the social security and health care systems. In the short-run
privatisation can result in unemployment increase, which is independent from the monetary policy
shocks. On the other hand, there were frequent privatisation clauses pressing new owners to keep
employment at the pre-privatisation level over a certain period, leading to the postponed lay-offs.
Institutional shocks comprise also changes in the social security and health care systems. In 2000
this led those employed in the hidden economy to register as unemployed to be eligible for social
benefits. 
Fig. 2
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The results of Kim and Roubini decomposition (Fig. 4) are very similar to the second
specification of the CEE, with an exception of the response of the CPI to the exchange rate shock.
The size of the “output puzzle” and the subsequent output fall is comparable in both specifications.
The maximal impact of the interest rate shock on output occurs 16-19 months after the shock, like
in the U.K., but markedly later than in the euro area. There is a noticeable but temporary (as
expected) output increase after the exchange rate shock (depreciation). Like in all previous
specifications and in many VAR results for other countries (e.g. Bean et al. results for the U.K. and
Peersman and Smets for the U.S) there is a small and short-lived price puzzle. The maximal reaction
of the CPI to the interest rate shock comes about with a delay of 21-23 months. This is much earlier
than in euro area, the U.S. or the U.K. The CPI response to the interest rate shock is much smaller
and short-lived in Poland than in these countries. The timing of output response and inflation
response seems to be reasonable, with the maximal adjustment of output noticeably exceeding
prices. As we have mentioned before, Kim and Roubini decomposition changes the pattern of price
adjustment after the exchange rate shock. While CEE decomposition produced a prolonged
increase in prices after a deprecionary shock, Kim and Roubini decomposition provides a very short
one. The latter is broadly consistent with estimates of pass-through on monthly data in Przystupa
(2002). Narrow money (money demand) reacts to the interest rate shock in the expected way;
short-term interest rate increases after the exchange rate depreciation. None of these
decompositions produces an exchange rate puzzle, i.e. exchange rate depreciation after a
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Fig. 4
IRF  from Kim and Roubini decomposition, 1995.01-2002.0316
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The results from our VAR’s show that the impulse response functions obtained from the CEE
specification with industrial output, CPI and the exchange rate as variables in the central bank
reaction function are very similar to those obtained from the non-recursive decomposition of the
Kim and Roubini type. The impulse response functions behave in a way that is closer to the intuition
than the impulse response from the CEE-type decomposition with CPI and credit to the non-
financial sector in the reaction function, suggesting a better identification of the monetary policy
shock. 
To  see whether monetary transmission mechanism was stable we have estimated a VAR
model (Kim and Roubini decomposition) on a shorter sample, ending in 2000. While there was no
institutional change in 2001 that could justify such a sample break, first months of 2001 started a
relatively prolonged process of the headline interest rates fall and a period of the lowest inflation
rate Poland has experienced since the start of the transition process. 
A comparison of Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 reveals that the impulse response functions are rather
stable. The changes are minor; they concern industrial output and prices. IRF of industrial output
exhibits a deeper fall when it is estimated on a sample ending in 2002.03 than on the shorter one.
On the other hand, it reacts less over the sample 1995-2002 to the exchange rate shock. We do
not have any sound explanation why over the longer sample price puzzle became bigger,
presumably interest rate policy of the central bank was more backward looking than before. Prices
also seem to be slightly less responsive to the exchange rate shock. This in turn can be due to the
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Fig. 5
IRF from Kim and Roubini decomposition, 1995.01-2000.124
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4.2 Transmission in the banking sector
4.2.1. Loan response to the monetary policy shocks
To check the responsiveness of various categories of credit to private individuals and to the
corporate sector we use the CEE decomposition method. The specification was just as in our
previous “better” VAR, i.e. industrial output, CPI, interest rate and exchange rate. Now we add
credit and order it last. Credit to private individuals and to the corporate sector is divided into three
groups: short-term (with maturity of up to 1 year), medium-term (maturity of above 1 to 5 years)
and long-term (maturity of above 5 years). Term structure of loans to the corporate sector is rather
stable, whereas this of the private individuals has changed significantly, see Fig. 6.
Foreign currency loans (FCL) stand for an increasing part of the total lending to the non-
financial sector (at the end of 2001 the share of FCL in the total credit amounted to 24%) because
of a high interest rate differential and a low perception of the exchange rate risk. Thus, to some
extent, an increase in the domestic interest rates leads to a substitution of lending in the domestic
currency (z∏oty) with lending in foreign currencies. FCL to the corporate sector are almost evenly
distributed between the maturities selected above, whereas in case of the household sector, they
concentrate in the third group, i.e. the group of long-term credits, and they are typically for housing. 
Our previous VAR showed that after a contractionary interest rate shock, the z∏oty
temporarily slightly appreciates. This should lead to a reduction in the z∏oty value of the FCL. If the
interest rate differential gets bigger, then households and firms are more willing to draw new FCL
or denominate the existing z∏oty loans. The latter effect is probably not very big because of the
transaction cost. Assuming that the initial exchange rate effect on FCL is only minor and/or short-
lived, we would expect that after monetary policy tightening, lending to the households and the
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Fig. 6 
1996 and 2001 credit term structure18
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shorter the maturity of loans, the more responsive to the monetary policy they should be. But there
is more than that. As Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) point, monetary policy tightening can initially
induce an increase in some types of credit. The best borrowers, e.g. big firms, may demand more
credit at prevailing interest rates to buffer any decline in cash flow. Other borrowers face a decline
in credit supply. Therefore, it may happen that total bank credit will not decline instantaneously (see
also Garretsen and Swank, 1998). The response of various categories of credit is shown in Fig. 7.
Just as expected, short-term credit to private persons seems to be the most responsive to the
monetary policy shocks among all analysed categories of loans. It reacts almost at once and the
reaction reaches the maximum 20 months after the shock. Medium-term and especially long-term
credits are better secured, so there is less risk for the creditor and less incentives to reduce the
supply. Thus, not surprisingly, these credits react with more delay and the reaction is smaller. Long-
term credits increase initially – we cannot rule out that there is also some substitution effect, but a
sound discussion of this effect needs a further research. 
On the other hand, short-term credits to the corporate sector seem not to react at all to the
monetary policy shocks. They are probably better secured than short-term credit to private persons,
so banks have less incentives to reduce the supply. The behaviour of this type of credits seems to
correspond with a lagged reaction of industrial output after monetary policy shock, but further
research of this effect is needed, including analysis of credit use at the industry branch level
6.
Medium-term credit responds in a way predicted by a standard textbook, i.e. it declines after a short
lag. Long-term credit seems to exhibit the effect described by Gertler and Gilchrist  - it increases
initially to fall with a considerable delay. 
As we have mentioned before, applying such a VAR specification we cannot conclude
whether these response functions reflect rather supply-side (lending channel) or demand-side
(interest rate channel) adjustment. A following part of he paper is aimed to provide some insights
into the operation of the lending channel in Poland.  
4.2.2. Bank-specific characteristics and monetary transmission (by Ma∏gorzata
Paw∏owska)
The necessary condition for the lending channel to operate is a dominant role of banks as a
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Fig. 7
IRF of credit to private persons (top panel) and to the corporate sector (bottom panel) 
to a 1 pp interest rate shock
6 We hope to get some information form a business survey conducted by NBP on a quarterly basis.4
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access to the capital market, their investment expenditures will depend on bank credit. Therefore,
monetary tightening reducing bank reserves results in a reduction of loan supply, this in turn affects
investment of the private sector and output growth. 
A simple conclusion from this very brief description of the lending channel is that for some
banks it may be easier to protect their loan portfolio and offset monetary policy tightening than for
others. These bank-specific characteristics are:  
• Size. Due to asymmetric information problem small banks can have more difficulties to
raise non-deposit funds to offset monetary policy tightening and keep the supply of loans
at a desired level. Put it another way, after monetary policy tightening, small banks reduce
lending more than large banks (Kashyap, Stein 1995).
• The degree of liquidity. More liquid banks can easier shield their loan portfolio than less
liquid banks and offset monetary policy tightening.  Specifically, after an increase in the
central bank interest rate they can reduce their portfolio of liquid assets (e.g. bonds) to
avoid cutting loans. The rationale for such a buffer-stock behaviour of banks is the
existence of credit lines, protecting the credit relationship with the client and the lack of a
secondary market for the intermediated loans  (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Garretsen and
Swank, 1998; Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Lending channel operates if a reduction of loans
to the private sector is bigger than the reduction of bank liquid assets.  
• The degree of capitalisation. Poorly capitalised banks have a more limited access to non-
deposit financing and therefore reduce lending more than the better capitalised ones
(Peek, Rosengren, 1995). 
In Poland bank credit is the most important source of financing the private sector. Equities and
corporate bonds play only a minor role. The ratio of short- and long-term corporate securities to the
bank credit in 2001 was about 10-12% and was not very different from the respective figure for Spain
(see Ehrmann et al., Table 1).  The stock exchange capitalisation to the GDP is growing but nonetheless
it is low – in 1995 it was as low as 3,7%, at the end of 2001 it attained the level of about 14%. 
On the other hand, a factor that can potentially disable the operation of the credit channel
in Poland is the existence of a (persistent) surplus liquidity, defined as a net indebtedness of a central
bank with respect to commercial banks. One can suspect that in such conditions banks (at least
these overliquid) are less responsive to the monetary policy tightening since to avoid cutting loans
they can reduce the portfolio of the NBP-bills. Surplus liquidity was concentrated in a relatively small
number of the biggest commercial banks.  
To compare the results on the credit channel in Poland to these in the euro area, we follow
the method used by Ehrmann et al. (2001).  Namely, we estimate equation (6) and assume that
bank loan reaction to monetary policy depends linearly on the bank characterising variable (size,
liquidity or capitalisation) and is therefore allowed to vary across banks and time. This is captured
by interaction terms (xit-1*Drt). In the model the distributional effects of monetary policy should be
reflected in a significant interaction term of bank specific characteristic with the monetary policy
indicator. We expect a positive coefficient on the interaction terms since as we have pointed, small,
less liquid and less capitalised banks are more sensitive to the monetary policy actions than the
bigger, more liquid and better-capitalised counterparts.  
In our estimate we use the definitions of measures for bank-specific characteristics suggested
by Ehrmann et al.  Namely, the log of total assets (Ait) measures the size of a bank; liquidity is the
ratio of liquid assets (Lit sum of cash, interbank lending and securities to total assets Ait), and
capitalisation is defined as the ratio of capital and reserves Cit, to total assets Ait). All bank- specific
characteristics are normalised with respect to their average across all banks to get indicators that
sum to zero over all observations. For the regression model the average of the interaction term
(xit-1*Drt) is therefore zero, too. 20
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In the estimation we use NBP balance sheet statistics comprising 48 commercial banks. We
use quarterly data (1997.4-2001.4), therefore there are 672 observations in the panel. To estimate
the equation (6) we apply the GLS method and estimate a fixed effect model. 
First, in the regression 1 for the variable xi we substitute (Siz), then in regression (2) and (3)
-  (Liq), and (Cap) respectively. The main results of the estimation are summarised in Tab. 1.
The long-run coefficient
7 on the size interaction term is positive and significant (regression 1).
This indicates that the long-run effect of an increase in the interest rate on bank lending is smaller
for a bigger bank. In the case of liquidity (regression 2) the long-run coefficient is significant but –
contrary to our expectations – negative. We suspect that this result is due to the mentioned above
surplus liquidity, but a further analysis, including re-estimation of the equation (1) on the data
excluding the overliquid banks is needed.
In the case of capitalisation (regression 3) the long-run coefficient is – as expected – significant
and positive. This indicates that the long-run effect of an increase in the interest rate on bank lending
is the smaller, the more capitalised a bank is. This finding implies that, in periods of a restrictive
monetary policy small, poorly capitalised banks reduce lending more than big, well-capitalised banks.
The results obtained on the national quarterly data set show that in contrast to the euro
countries, where the degree of liquidity seems to be the characteristic that affects the shape of the
lending channel the most, in Poland it is the size and capitalisation. The estimated coefficient on
capitalisation is somewhat higher than these obtained for the selected countries of the euro zone
(Ehrmann et al., 2001) we would like to stress however, that the persistent overliquidity of the
banking system could affect the result of our estimation.
4.2.3. Interest rate pass-through
Theory suggests that under perfect competition, prices equal marginal cost, implying that
retail bank rates should fully adjust to the respective money market rates. Relaxing the assumption
of perfect competition leads to a sluggish and less than full adjustment to the marginal cost. This
is however not the sole cause of the sluggishness and less than full adjustment. The interest rate
pass-through is delayed and less than one to one because of: 
• fixed adjustment costs of changing prices; 
• uncertainty about the future evolution of central bank and money markets rates; due to
adjustment costs and possible loss of the market share resulting from adjustment to the
Tab. 1
Bank – specific characteristics affecting lending channel – estimation results (1997.4-2001.4)
variable [expected sign] regression 1(Siz) regression 2(Liq) regression 3(Cap)
*[ ?] 4.6942 [+] -0.12460 [+] 6.282 [+]
p-value (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
7 Long-run coefficient is a sum of the coefficients on the various lags of a variable, divided by 1 minus the sum of the
coefficients on the lagged endogenous variable. 4
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transitory changes in the money markets rates, banks tend to react less frequently, and
make larger adjustments;   
• possibility of substitution of loans and deposits by economic agents, i.e. access to the
capital market. When close substitutes to bank deposits and loans do not exist banks can
then exert some market power and adjust less than fully (de Bondt, 2002).
The degree of concentration of the Polish bank sector
8 measured with the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index and the share of the five largest banks in deposit and credit market is medium to
low (see Tab. 2). There was no a clear-cut tendency in the degree of market concentration: after an
initial fall due to establishment of new units, in 1999 started the process of bank consolidation
resulting in higher indices of bank sector concentration. 
Empirical evidence from the U.S. and the euro zone shows that the delay in banks’ response
amounts even to several months. There is a considerable asymmetry in the retail rates reaction: loan
rates seem to increase more than deposit rates when monetary policy is tightened and to fall less
than deposit rates when market rates fall. Evidence that can be obtained on the Polish data is very
limited, because periods of upward and downward movements in the market interest rates
alternated and each of them was relatively short (see Fig. 8).
Tab. 2
Bank sector concentration level (for H-H indices 1= full concentration)
Concentration measure 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002*
(end of year)
Assets: H-H index  0.076  0.074  0.067  0.079  0.076  0.086  0.089  
Assets: 5 major banks (in %)  51.2  48.4  44.8  49.8  48.5 54.2  56.4  
Deposits: H-H index  0.122  0.120  0.108  0.118  0.115  0.119  0.122  
Deposits: 5 major banks (in %)  55.4  54.9  45.6  58.3  57.7  62.2  63.5  
Credits: H-H index  0.061  0.057  0.052  0.070  0.070  0.079  0.079  
Credits: 5 major banks (in %) 46.6  43.7  37.5  48.5  48.7  50.3 5 4.3  
*end of first quarter 2002
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Fig. 8
Deposit and loan rates
8 Excluding co-operative banks representing ca 5% of the total banking sector. Over the analysed period banking sector
consisted of ca 100 commercial banks. 22
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The results of the estimation of the ECM model as in (7) are shown in Tab. 3 - Tab. 6. We
used WIBOR rates (Warsaw Interbank Offer Rate) of maturity 1 and 3 months as money market
rates. 1-month WIBOR is a valid rate for 1-month personal deposit, personal loan and 12-month
loan to the corporate sector. For all other deposit and loan rates we used 3-month WIBOR. In
principle, we should have used money market rates of maturity comparable with a respective
deposit or loan, but due to uncertainty, over the sample span transactions in the money market for
periods exceeding three months were quite rare. As a result banks’ quotations for longer periods
do not bring sound economic information. To shed some light on a possible asymmetry of banks’
reactions and to overcome the problem of too short sub-samples, we have estimated (7) for the
period 1995-2000 and 1995-2002. In 2001-2002 there were frequent reductions in the NBP rates
and we want to check whether the size and speed of adjustment is stable in both periods. 
The inspection of Tab. 3 and Tab. 4 reveals that the parameter reflecting the instantaneous
adjustment of the deposit rates is higher for the period 1995-2002 than for the period 1995-2000,
the difference is however not statistically significant. On the other hand, parameters reflecting the
speed of an error correction fell, and the resulting mean lag of adjustment stayed the same. The
only exception is 1-month deposit. Mean average lag of adjustment ranged from 2.5 to 4.1 months
over the period 1995-2000. Due to lengthening of the mean adjustment lag of 1-month deposits
to more than four months, the respective figures for the period 1995-2002.02 became higher and
amounted to 3.2-4.3 months. 
Wald test shows that all deposits but these of 1-month maturity fully respond to the changes
in the respective money market rate. 3-month deposit did not react fully over the period 1995-
2000, but for the longer sample, up to 2002 we cannot reject that it totally responded to the
money market rate.   
There is an increase in the long-run adjustment parameter, b2 that could reflect asymmetry
in banks’ reactions – i.e. a bigger reaction of deposit rates when money market rates fall than when
they go up, but – once again – with the exception of 1-month deposit this increase was not
statistically significant.  
For the loan rates data series are generally much shorter than for the deposits. With the
exception of 12-month loan rate to the corporate sector, they start in December 1996. The
adjustment pattern of these rates seems to be more stable than of the deposit rates, but this can
result from the difference of the sample span. Parameters reflecting the size of the instantaneous
adjustment are in general similar to that estimated for the deposits. Wald test shows that both rates
on loans of maturity longer than 5 years and on consumer loans do not adjust fully to the market
rates. While the result for the consumer credit is just as we have expected, the latter can be due to
the fact that in our estimates we have used 3-month market rate and this can be too short for a 5-
year credit. The mean adjustment lag of loan rates over the sample period ranges from 1.8 months
to 3.8 months. This result presumably reflects the problem of asymmetric information cost – for
unsecured loans they are higher than for the secured loans (see Tab. 5 and Tab. 6).
The size of retail rates adjustment in Poland seems to be somewhat bigger than in the euro
zone (see De Bondt, 2002), but a straightforward comparison is not easy. First, deposit rates that
in the euro zone seem to be the most rigid  concern products which are either not offered by the
Polish banking sector or the central bank so far has not been collecting these data (deposits of
maturities shorter than 1 month). As in the euro zone, Polish shortest deposit rate does not adjust
fully. Only after adopting the euro, i.e. since January 1999 the transmission of the changes in
market rates to the deposit rates in the euro zone gets much faster than before and it is clearly
faster than in Poland.
Comparing adjustment of lending rates is easier, because there is no data problem. In
general, in Poland lending rates seem to adjust faster – the lags in the euro zone range from 2.8
months to about 10 months, while in Poland the adjustment takes no more than four months. As
in the case of the deposit rates, after adopting the euro, the speed of the interest rate adjustment
in the euro zone has accelerated, but nonetheless it is still not faster than in Poland. Such a relatively24
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fast pass-through from the market rates to the retail rates in Poland as compared to the euro
countries could result from the much higher inflation rate that persisted in Poland for the whole
analysed period.  
To check whether the concentration degree affects retail rates we have done a simple exercise
adding monthly Herfindahl-Hirschman indices to the previously estimated pass-through equations.
This approach is far from being satisfying, but seems to be the only solution in a situation of a
relatively scarce data set on deposit and credit rates and impossibility of dividing the sample into
long enough sub-samples of monetary easing and tightening
9. From this simple exercise we can
draw two main conclusions. First is that the degree of concentration mattered for both deposit and
lending rate adjustment (the estimated coefficients were significant). For deposits the estimated
coefficients were positive, while for credits – negative. With the overall downward trend of interest
rates over the sample period (see Fig. 8) it means that an increase in concentration reduced the
adjustment of lending rates and increased the adjustment of deposit rates.
9 Mojon (2000) uses estimated three-month elasticities of deposit and loan rates with respect to market interest rates
obtained from a standard error-correction model of retail rates pass-through in panel estimates to check for  the role of
the of market competition.
Tab. 3
Deposit rates pass-through, 1995-2000
D De ep po os si it t   r ra at te e a a0 a a1 b b1 b b2 R R
2 2 ( (a ad dj j) ) S SE E M Me ea an n   a ad dj ju us st tm me en nt t   l la ag g
( (m mo on nt th hs s) )
1 month 0.37 0.22 0.30 0.65 0.47 0.38 2.5
(0.25) (0.045 (0.054) (0.035)
3 months -0.42 0.30 0.22 0.83 0.46 0.46 3.2
(0.28) (0.066) (0.039) (0.056)
6 months -0.50 0.32 0.18 0.90 0.37 0.6 3.7
(0.35) (0.081) (0.039) (0.083)
12 months -0.60 0.34 0.16 0.99 0.36 0.6 4.1
(0.38) (0.084) (0.034) (0.102)
Standard errors in parantheses
Tab. 4
Deposit rates pass-through, 1995-2002.03Deposit rates pass-through, 1995-2002.03
D De ep po os si it t   r ra at te e a a0 a a1 b b1 b b2 R R
2 2 ( (a ad dj j) ) S SE E M Me ea an n   a ad dj ju us st tm me en nt t   l la ag g
( (m mo on nt th hs s) )
1 month -0.40 0.28 0.17 0.80 0.34 0.44 4.3
(0.21) (0.047) (0.049) (0.067)
3 months -0.77 0.36 0.20 0.91 0.43 0.46 3.2
(0.24) (0.061) (0.038) (0.051)
6 months -0.81 0.38 0.17 0.98 0.36 0.55 3.6
(0.30) (0.07) (0.037) (0.07)
12 months -0.88 0.39 0.15 1.07 0.35 0.58 4.1
(0.32) (0.077) (0.033) (0.088)
Standard errors in parantheses4
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Tab. 5
Lending rates pass-through, 1997-2000
D De ep po os si it t   r ra at te e a a0 a a1 b b1 b b2 R R
2 2 ( (a ad dj j) ) S SE E M Me ea an n   a ad dj ju us st tm me en nt t   l la ag g
( (m mo on nt th hs s) )
Consumer credit 1.54 0.23 0.22 0.85 0.59 0.43 3.5
(0.63) (0.068) (0.048) (0.084)
Up to 1 year- to firms*  0.6 0.16 0.28 0.99 0.49 0.46 3.0
(0.35) (0.068) (0.038) (0.055)
Over 1 year to 3 years – to firms 0.72 0.33 0.27 0.97 0.67 0.4 2.5
(0.40) (0.08) (0.051) (0.058)
Over 5 years – to firms 1.75 0.33 0.36 0.85 0.57 0.47 1.9
(0.58) (0.09) (0.074) (0.048)
*Sample 1995-2000.12.
Standard errors in parantheses
Tab. 6
Lending rates pass-through, 1997-2002.03
D De ep po os si it t   r ra at te e a a0 a a1 b b1 b b2 R R
2 2 ( (a ad dj j) ) S SE E M Me ea an n   a ad dj ju us st tm me en nt t   l la ag g
( (m mo on nt th hs s) )
Consumer credit 1.44 0.24 0.20 0.85 0.53 0.43 3.8
(0.59 (0.061) (0.044) (0.085)
Up to 1 year- to firms* 0.24 0.20 0.27 1.03 0.44 0.56 3.0
(0.27) (0.06) (0.035) (0.048)
Over 1 year to 3 years – to firms 0.6 0.36 0.26 0.98 0.65 0.38 2.5
(0.32) (0.067) (0.045) (0.05)
Over 5 years – to firms 1.85 0.32 0.37 0.84 0.58 0.43 1.8
(0.32) (0.075) (0.066) (0.037)
*Sample 1995-2002.03.
Standard errors in parantheses26
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5
Conclusions
In this paper we present the results of estimates of interest rate channel and credit channel
in Poland for the period 1995-2002.03 using SVAR approach (Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans and
Kim and Roubini decompositions) as well as simple structural, one equation models. 
Here we summarise the main results:
• Monetary policy tightening (increase in short-term interest rate) results in lower inflation
and temporarily lower industrial output and retail sales. Exchange rate appreciates, money
demand (M1) falls, TB-yields increase. The response of both output and CPI to the interest
rate shock (one s.d. innovations) in Poland is smaller than in countries of the euro zone. 
• Unemployment reacts to the monetary policy tightening in a nonsensical way, probably
due to the dominance of supply shocks over demand shocks and many institutional shocks
affecting labour market.
• Credits to private individuals respond to the monetary policy shocks in the expected way:
short-term credits fall instantaneously, whereas medium- and long-term with a delay. The
initial increase of long-term credits can result from the substitution effect (a switch from
credits in the domestic currency to credits in foreign currencies).
• Short-term credit to firms does not react to monetary tightening. We do not have a sound
explanation of this effect. Other types of credit to firms behave in an expected way. Long-
term credit plausibly exhibits a phenomenon described by Gertler and Gilchrist, i.e. an
initial increase after monetary tightening due to an increased demand for credit of the best
borrowers to buffer a fall in the cash flow.    
• Credit channel operates mainly through small, poorly capitalised banks.
• Immediate pass-through of interest rates is incomplete. On the other hand, in the long run
the adjustment is close to 100%. The exception is 1-month deposit rate and lending rate
over 5 years to firms. The speed of interest rate pass-through in Poland over the analysed
period was relatively high. It needs to be stressed however, that we do not have the data
on the shortest deposit rate (O/N) which supposedly reacts as the lowest pace.   
• The degree of concentration, measured with Hirfendahl-Hirschman index, affects interest
rate transmission. Over the sample period with the overall downward trend of interest
rates, an increase in concentration reduced the magnitude of loan rate cuts and increased
deposit rate cuts. 6
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